An apparently leaked memo attributed to former Russian minister Dmitri Rogozin reports major shortcomings in the Russian army’s equipment, including artillery far inferior to Western equivalents, a shortage of 152 mm shells, inadequate communications and obsolete UAVs.

The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel has published 4 pages of a memo signed in Rogozin’s name and addressed to Anton Vaino, the head of the Russian Presidential Administration. It tackles “problematic issues of organisation and management of combat operations” in the war in Ukraine.

Rogozin served as deputy prime minister in charge of the defence industry from 2011 to 2018, then as head of the Russian space agency Roscosmos until being fired in July 2022. He has since been trying to make himself relevant again, which is likely the context for the memo.

Rogozin declared himself the head of the “Tsar’s Wolves” inspection group of volunteers, with the stated aim of testing and supplying weapons for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Assuming the memo is genuine, it likely reflects his discussions with those involved in procurement.

He writes that he has been in “consultations with a number of military commanders in the zone of the Special Military Operation (SMO) general designers of weapons and military equipment as well as on the basis of the experience I have acquired over the past nine months”.

These discussions have led him to identify “4 key issues, on the solution of which the success of the Special Military Operation (SMO) largely depends.”

1/ The first category is “Organisation and conduct of counter-battery warfare”, in which he says that Russian counter-battery radars cannot detect long-range Western-supplied artillery and Russian artillery batteries don’t have the range to fire back. Specifically:

a) Obsolete artillery reconnaissance means of the Zoopark radar, ACP, AZK in terms of range do not correspond to the technical characteristics of the enemy’s artillery systems: M777, “Paladin”, “Krab”, and all the more so “MLRS”, “MARS”;

b) the absence of counter-battery firepower from the combined barrel artillery at the firing range of Western artillery systems. The use of only long-range 152 mm shells (of which there is an acute shortage). Often the use of BM-21 and Uragan missiles, the accuracy of which is negligible; Consideration is currently being given to the establishment of separate teams in each regiment (brigade) using [DJI] Matrice 300 quadrocopters …"

[Here there is apparently a missing page covering issue 2.]

3/ On the next extant page, the author discusses problems with radio communications systems, focusing on the new but problematic Azart system that the Russian military introduced in the 2010s and the lack of other modern communications equipment.

He writes that there is “[a lack of?] stability, secrecy and promptness of the transfer of official information, and under certain conditions, a complete loss of communication.” Specifically, he notes of the Azart:

(a) … The technical specifications do not correspond to the declared data, there is no base radio station, retransmission is possible only through the same radio station, arranged as a repeater. So, in a brigade (regiment), to create the smallest system of communication in defence, you need to put at least 20 radios as repeaters. Communication in the PPRCh mode [frequency-hopping spread spectrum] with armoured vehicles is impossible due to the absence of this mode on standard weapons stations;

b) Tanks, self-propelled artillery and armoured vehicles are equipped with communications equipment of the last generation, operating in the open mode and exposed to the effects of electronic warfare. In order to organise stable communications, additional vehicle radios of the “Hitera”, “Motorola”, “Kombat”, “Kirosan” types are installed, which only partially solve the problem of command and control;

c) The arrival of diverse means of radio communication for the troops has led to re-sorting and lack of compatibility, [it is impossible to] organise interaction in combat, both in the connection (unit) and with neighbours. Even though the Azart radios are inadequate, the troops do not have enough of them;

d) Space (satellite) communication facilities are necessary up to and including battalion level, as well as in reconnaissance, artillery and air defence units;

e) The supply of Arakhis-2, Argon and Granit communications equipment, which have already proved to be highly effective, is carried out in minimal quantities. There are no company or battalion sets of radios in this inventory, especially for armoured vehicles. These types of radios are more often most commonly used by special operations and reconnaissance units."

4/ In the next section, the author discusses “Reconnaissance organisation issues”, by which he means aerial reconnaissance using UAVs. He highlights critical problems with the capabilities and quantities of Russia’s UAVs:

a) … At the tactical and operational level, the main means of obtaining firing coordinates of troops and enemy facilities at a depth of 3 to 60 kilometres are UAVs of various types.

b) The types of UAVs adopted into service before the beginning of the Special Military Operation (SMO) are outdated and ineffective, and their video and photo equipment does not provide the required resolution and image clarity. These are such types as Orlan-10, Granat, Tachyon, and Aileron. These UAVs are not immune from enemy electronic warfare, and because of this, there are large losses in the course of their use. The previously used devices of the “Kometa” type have not been finalised.

The new models - more jamming-proof and with better optical equipment, such as “Zala”, “Supercam” (the cost of one device is about 25 million rubles [$264,000]) and others, cannot yet cover the need of the troops during the course of the SMO.

Among other things, the issue of training specialists for these types of UAVs has not been fully resolved.

"While we are still getting ready for the use of the Supercam in the zone of the SMO in cooperation with the manufacturer’s representatives, the Zala requires a trip to the territory of the Russian Federation for a period of up to 3 weeks.

"In regular UAV units, 10-30% of the total number of aircraft are available (taking into account combat losses). Every aircraft is accounted for.

"Despite improvements in the quality of UAV optics and technical parameters of the complexes, the issues of countering the enemy’s electronic defence systems have not been resolved.

"There is no proper feedback from the Russian Ministry of Defence to industry and leading state design bureaus.

“Nevertheless, the issues of organizing direct dialogue between the troops and industry, including private engineering companies, are solvable and require only will and organization of efforts.” /end

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